1.03.1977

Garrett Hardin

Garrett Hardin, "Ethical Implications of Carrying Capacity", , ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.

The theory of discounting, using commercially realistic rates of interest, virtually writes off the future. The consequences have been well described by Fife and Clark. Devotion to economic discounting in its present form is suicidal. How soon is it so? 'In the long run', an economist would say, since disaster is more than five years off. 'In the short run', according to biologists, since disaster occurs in much less than the million or so years that is the normal life expectancy of a species. [113]

The foundation of situational ethics is this: The morality of an act is determined by the state of the system at the time the act is performed. Ecology, a system-based view of the world, demands situational ethics. ...
The legislative process is a slow one. Situational ethics seems almost to demand an administrative approach; by statute, administrators can be given the power to make instant, detailed decisions within a legally defined framework. Rules promulgated by an administrative agency are called administrative law.
On paper, the system may look fine, but the general public is understandably afraid of it. Administrative law gives power to administrators, who are human and hence fallible. Their decisions may be self-serving. John Adams called for 'a government of laws, and not of men'. We rightly esteem this as a desirable ideal. The practical question we must face is how far can we safely depart from the ideal undert he pressure of ecological necessity? This is the harrowing Quis custodiet problem; it has not easy solutions. [114]

We may speculate - we can hardly know - that the long avoidance of the commons problem was due to a subconscious awareness of the intractable Quis custodiet problem, which would have been activated by any attempt to depart from the system of the commons. [115]

1.02.1977

Ilya Prigogine

Ilya Prigogine, Peter Allen, Robert Herman, "Long Term Trends and the Evolution of Complexity", ed. Ervin Laszlo, Goals in a Global Community, New York, Pergamon Press, 1977.

We find that if there is a certain 'plasticity' of the 'genetic' matter, there can only result a greater exploitation of the environment.
In this very simple system, evolution leads to the gradual filling of the available resource spectrum and to the increasing effectiveness of the exploitation of each resource. Of course, the above case has been chosen because it is especially simple. However, a mathematical criterion can be derived which is valid for the general case of n-interacting genotype populations which are perturbed by the arrival of small quantities of several mutant populations. Such considerations lead to an interpretation of the evolution of ecosystems in terms of a 'dialogue' between fluctuations leading to innovations and the deterministic response of the interacting species already existing in the ecosystem. The basic aspect is the selective advantage which is introduced through the new values of the parameters (such as K, N, d) which enter into the equations describing the populations dynamics [birthrate, carrying capacity, death rate]. Note that the exact mechanism of fluctuations is left unspecified. Briefly speaking, Darwinism supposes an origin of fluctuations based on random genetic variation, which may certainly be appropriate for many aspects of biological evolution, while Lamarckism supposes a 'learning' mechanism of the individuals trying to adapt to the environment. Socio-cultural evolution would seem to correspond more closely to this second type of interpretation. [53]
[Only if socio-cultural evolution applied to the vehicle rather than the meme]

It is further possible to deduce how many species will be found occupying a fully evolved ecosystem with a given resource spectrum. The species packing is determined by the level of environmental fluctuation, and in particular by the amount of coherence of resource fluctuation. The greater the fluctuation the greater the niche separation must be for the long term co-existence of neighboring species. Knowing the niche width from our evolution theory, we can now say that ecosystems rich in resources and not suffering large fluctuations will have the greatest number of species. Environmental fluctuations will reduce this number. A system with sparsely scattered resources, if their densities do not fluctuate greatly, will be populated by 'generalist' species with considerable niche overlap, while a poor system with fluctuating resources will be filled with a few 'generalist' species. [54]
[How does fluctuation rates or resource spectrums translate to co-existing social behavior-species in social ecosystems?]

Since the advent of quantum mechanics, many attempts have been made to relate microscopic indeterminacy, i.e., the celebrated Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, to macroscopic behavior. We now see that the situation is much simpler, for the macroscopic equations themselves contain the elements of stochasticity which leads to 'macroscopic indeterminacy'. Problems such as self-organization in non-equilibrium systems require both aspects - the deterministic one where averages represent accurately the physical state of the system and the stochastic one which is important near bifurcation points and instabilities. It is the cooperation of these two features which leads to a faithful representation of some of the basic aspects of evolving systems. [57]

Complexity is limited by stability which, in turn, is limited by the strength of the system-environment coupling. [58]

'man's particular relation to the environment is fundamentally similar to that of any other species, in that it is a continuing effort to exercise sufficient control to extract energy from the environment. Particularly typical of man, however, is his cultural mode of behavior which leads him to seek this security of control through constant redefinition of himself and his environment, permitting him to develop his society into an ever expanding system.' R.N. Adams, Energy and Structure, 1975. [59]

1.01.1977

Garrett Hardin

Garrett Hardin, "An Operational Analysis of 'Responsibility'", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.

The philosopher Charles Frankel has given such a definition: 'A decision is responsible when the man or group that makes it has to answer for it to those who are directly or indirectly affected by it.' [66]
[The structure of responsibility]

Contrived responsibilities can be effectively applied to the decision maker only if the community is well informed of the consequences of his decisions. But the person who makes the decisions is generally in the most favorable position to control the flow of information about the consequences of his decisions. If he makes a bad decision he is then tempted to falsify the information about the consequences. In other words, he is tempted to sabotage the information system, as the private enterpriser is not. [72]

1.01.1976

Richard Dawkins

Richard Dawkins, "Memes: The New Replicators", The Selfish Gene, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976[1989].

The gene, the DNA molecule, happens to be the replicating entity that prevails on our own planet. There may be others. If there are, provided certain other conditions are met, they will almost inevitably tend to become the basis for an evolutionary process. [192]

We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 'Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. [192]

Whenever conditions arise in which a new kind of replicator can make copies of itself, the new replicators will tend to take over, and start a new kind of evolution of their own. Once this new evolution begins, it will in no necessary sense be subservient to the old. The old gene-selected evolution, by making brains, provided the 'soup' in which the first memes arose. Once self-copying memes had arisen, their own, much faster, kind of evolution took off. We biologists have assimilated the idea of genetic evolution so deeply that we tend to forget that it is only one of many possible kinds of evolution. [194]

To take a particular example, an aspect of doctrine that has been very effective in enforcing religious observance is the threat of hell fire. Many children and even some adults believe that they will suffer ghastly torments after death if they do not obey the priestly rules. This is a peculiarly nasty technique of persuasion, causing great psychological anguish throughout the middle ages and even today. But it is highly effective. It might almost have been planned deliberately by a machiavellian priesthood trained in deep psychological indoctrination techniques. However, I doubt if the priests were that clever. Much more probably, unconscious memes have ensured their own survival by virtue of those same qualities of pseudo-ruthlessness that successful genes display. The idea of hell fire is, quite simply, self-perpetuating, because of its own deep psychological impact. It has become linked with the god meme because the two reinforce each other, and assist each other's survival in the meme pool. [198]

I conjecture that co-adapted meme-complexes evolve in the same kind of way as co-adapted gene-complexes. Selection favours memes that exploit their cultural environment to their own advantage. This cultural environment consists of other memes which are also being selected. The meme pool therefore comes to have the attributes of an evolutionarily stable set, which new memes find it hard to invade. [199]

What we have not previously considered is that a cultural trait may have evolved in the way that it has, simply because it is advantageous to itself. [200]

We do not even have to posit a genetic advantage in imitation, though that would certainly help. All that is necessary is that the brain should be capable of imitation: memes will then evolve that exploit the capability to the full. [200]

1.01.1974

Garrett Hardin

Garrett Hardin, "Living on a Lifeboat" (1974), ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.

'I feel guilty about my good luck', say some. The reply to this is simple: Get out and yield your place to others. Such a selfless action might satisfy the conscience of those who are addicted to guilt but it would not change the ethics of the lifeboat. The needy person to whom a guilt-addict yields his place will not himself feel guilty about his sudden good luck. (If he did he would not climb aboard.) The net result of conscience-stricken people relinquishing their unjustly held positions is the elimination of their kind of conscience from the lifeboat. The lifeboat, as it were, purifies itself of guilt. The ethics of the lifeboat persists, unchanged by such momentary aberrations. [263]

With distribution systems, as with individual morality, good intentions are no substitute for good performance. [265]

The question is, what are the operational consequences of establishing a world food bank? [267]

Our reluctance to embrace pure justice may spring from pure selfishness. On the other hand, it may arise from an unspoken recognition of consequences that have not yet been clearly spelled out. [275]

Clearly, the concept of pure justice produces an infinite regress. The law long ago invented statutes of limitations to justify the rejection of pure justice, in the interest of preventing massive disorder. The law zealously defends property rights - but only recent property rights. It is as though the physical principle of exponential decay applies to property rights. Drawing a line in time may be unjust, but any other action is practically worse. [276]