Elinor Ostrom, "Collective Action and the Tragedy of the Commons", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
The combined efforts of two different agencies pursuing related but different programs lead to a system of regulation that is reasonably honest and effective, achieve the objectives of ground-water basin management, and protect the interests of affected but unorganized individuals in the area. The existence of special taxing arrangements developed by some special-purpose districts enables them to provide the corrective feedback that Hardin argues is necessary 'to keep the custodians honest'. By focusing on the nation-state and on the need for a monopoly of coercive force, social scientists may have blinded themselves to the relevance for social analysis of the inventiveness of those who directly face common pool problems. [179]
W. Ross Ashby has demonstrated that adaptation to a complex environment is most efficient when subsystems have considerable independence and can proceed to adapt serially. Totally integrated systems may not be able to adapt to complex environments in sufficient time to enable them to survive over the long run. [179]
1.08.1977
1.07.1977
Elinor Ostrom
Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom, "A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
Side payments for sustaining voting coalitions represent a cost in political decision making, and in its most aggravated form may raid the public treasury as a common pool resource. Therefore, wherever a governmental jurisdiction represents constituencies of a significantly different magnitude from those affected by its actions, an increasing bias toward inefficient solutions can be expected. [161]
This divergence between the expected costs to affected individuals and those to public entrepreneurs will lead public entrepreneurs to stress decision-making costs [on the right] and to discount deprivation costs [on the left] in any discussion of a common pool problem. They will tend to exaggerate the crisis nature of problems, thus shifting the estimated total collective choice cost curve of most individuals upward to the right. This has the effect of moving the estimated optimal decision rule to the left or toward a less inclusive rule. If public entrepreneurs are successful in leading individuals to believe that important opportunities will be foregone unless authority is given to a few to make decisions rapidly, a decision rule delegating responsibility to a limited proportion of affected individuals may be adopted. Affected individuals may later feel that the deprivation costs of such a decision are too high and attempt to change the basic rules. [170]
Side payments for sustaining voting coalitions represent a cost in political decision making, and in its most aggravated form may raid the public treasury as a common pool resource. Therefore, wherever a governmental jurisdiction represents constituencies of a significantly different magnitude from those affected by its actions, an increasing bias toward inefficient solutions can be expected. [161]
This divergence between the expected costs to affected individuals and those to public entrepreneurs will lead public entrepreneurs to stress decision-making costs [on the right] and to discount deprivation costs [on the left] in any discussion of a common pool problem. They will tend to exaggerate the crisis nature of problems, thus shifting the estimated total collective choice cost curve of most individuals upward to the right. This has the effect of moving the estimated optimal decision rule to the left or toward a less inclusive rule. If public entrepreneurs are successful in leading individuals to believe that important opportunities will be foregone unless authority is given to a few to make decisions rapidly, a decision rule delegating responsibility to a limited proportion of affected individuals may be adopted. Affected individuals may later feel that the deprivation costs of such a decision are too high and attempt to change the basic rules. [170]
1.06.1977
Gordon Tullock
Gordon Tullock, "The Social Costs of Reducing Social Cost", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
In the market with externalities, the individual can be a free rider in the sense that he does not make payments. In governmental dealing with externalities, the individual can be a free rider in the sense that he acquires no information, and therefore, his decisions are uninformed. [151]
In the case of medicine, the individual characteristically first selects an expert advisor and then purchases the medicine on the advice of this expert. The only argument for restrictions is that the individual may injure himself because he is inadequately informed. Note, however, that it is the individual himself who bears the full cost of any such injury. Surely he would be motivated to acquire information for making his decision more strongly than he is motivated to acquire adequate information whether or not to have a seat belt in his car. [151]
We could expect that the voters' lack of information and thought would lead both to an increased importance of fashion and other fluctuating influences, and to the manipulation of the system by various interest groups. Probably civil servants and the media are the most powerful special interest groups. [154]
The voter is unable to determine the relative expertise of the specialists on each side and, hence, chooses to play safe by voting against the construction of new power plant. We can hardly blame the voter for this conclusion, assuming that he has no motive to become informed and that (particularly in this case) becoming well informed would be quite difficult. Decisions of this sort lead to optimum allocation of resources only by accident. However, a large number of such decisions are being made today, and it is likely that the cost to our society will be quite great. [155]
In the market with externalities, the individual can be a free rider in the sense that he does not make payments. In governmental dealing with externalities, the individual can be a free rider in the sense that he acquires no information, and therefore, his decisions are uninformed. [151]
In the case of medicine, the individual characteristically first selects an expert advisor and then purchases the medicine on the advice of this expert. The only argument for restrictions is that the individual may injure himself because he is inadequately informed. Note, however, that it is the individual himself who bears the full cost of any such injury. Surely he would be motivated to acquire information for making his decision more strongly than he is motivated to acquire adequate information whether or not to have a seat belt in his car. [151]
We could expect that the voters' lack of information and thought would lead both to an increased importance of fashion and other fluctuating influences, and to the manipulation of the system by various interest groups. Probably civil servants and the media are the most powerful special interest groups. [154]
The voter is unable to determine the relative expertise of the specialists on each side and, hence, chooses to play safe by voting against the construction of new power plant. We can hardly blame the voter for this conclusion, assuming that he has no motive to become informed and that (particularly in this case) becoming well informed would be quite difficult. Decisions of this sort lead to optimum allocation of resources only by accident. However, a large number of such decisions are being made today, and it is likely that the cost to our society will be quite great. [155]
1.05.1977
John Baden
John Baden, "A Primer for the Management of Common Pool Resources", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
In small groups (as in some communal situations) social pressure can induce contributions for public goods. Or, if there is a situation in which the private benefit from providing a public good is greater than its private costs, the public good will be supplied privately. [138]
[Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action]
To what degree is freedom to be sacrificed through the replacement of willing consent by coercion in order to protect or enhance an environmental resource? One of the most substantial costs of an increasing population is precisely the sacrifice in freedom necessitated by the need for maximizing production in a context of increasing interdependence and increasing demands on the resource base. In general, the world is taking on an ever-greater resemblance to a common pool [140]
As Gordon Tullock has remarked, government is nothing more than a prosaic instrument designed to coordinate human behavior through potential resort to coercion when the costs associated with reliance upon voluntary agreement are considered to be excessively high by a group of people possessing sufficient power to set and enforce the rules under which rules are made. [141]
Quite apart from the above considerations, there is a subtle and more pervasive problem inherent in reliance upon bureaucratic order to provide public goods and manage common pool resources. Every bureau has a bias toward growth beyond the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. [144]
In small groups (as in some communal situations) social pressure can induce contributions for public goods. Or, if there is a situation in which the private benefit from providing a public good is greater than its private costs, the public good will be supplied privately. [138]
[Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action]
To what degree is freedom to be sacrificed through the replacement of willing consent by coercion in order to protect or enhance an environmental resource? One of the most substantial costs of an increasing population is precisely the sacrifice in freedom necessitated by the need for maximizing production in a context of increasing interdependence and increasing demands on the resource base. In general, the world is taking on an ever-greater resemblance to a common pool [140]
As Gordon Tullock has remarked, government is nothing more than a prosaic instrument designed to coordinate human behavior through potential resort to coercion when the costs associated with reliance upon voluntary agreement are considered to be excessively high by a group of people possessing sufficient power to set and enforce the rules under which rules are made. [141]
Quite apart from the above considerations, there is a subtle and more pervasive problem inherent in reliance upon bureaucratic order to provide public goods and manage common pool resources. Every bureau has a bias toward growth beyond the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. [144]
1.04.1977
Garrett Hardin
Garrett Hardin, "Rewards of Pejoristic Thinking", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
Enthusiasts of individual freedom often acknowledge the existence of evil in the world, but they believe that the majority of mankind is basically good and that the majority is decisive in determining what happens. Sometimes this may be true; but there are many social processes that work in such a way the even the smallest minority spoils the results. [129]
Gresham's Law: Bad money drives out good. [evolution]
Note that when we are dealing with a monetary system a policy of voluntary compliance fails no matter how small the initial minority of noncooperators. Only a minority of zero would permit a voluntary system to work. Obviously, we would be fools to adopt any political or economic system that functions successfully only if literally everyone is virtuous. [129]
Pejoristic processes are easier to descry. Every pesticide, for example, selects for its own failure. (DDT, for instance, selects for DDT-resistant flies.) The rhythm method of birth control selects for arhythmic women. Voluntary population control selects for philoprogenitive instincts that mock at the system. Free competition among currencies selects for bad money. [131]
Though men have long assumed the general applicability of laissez-faire, they have not hitherto generalized from Gresham's Law to policy. In effect, they have treated this law as a special case. Had its generality been recognized earlier, we might sooner have recognized that in an unmanaged commons, greedy herdsmen drive out considerate one, grasping hunters drive out moderate ones, polluting industries drive out clean, and rapidly reproducing parents displace those who accept the limits to growth. [131]
Enthusiasts of individual freedom often acknowledge the existence of evil in the world, but they believe that the majority of mankind is basically good and that the majority is decisive in determining what happens. Sometimes this may be true; but there are many social processes that work in such a way the even the smallest minority spoils the results. [129]
Gresham's Law: Bad money drives out good. [evolution]
Note that when we are dealing with a monetary system a policy of voluntary compliance fails no matter how small the initial minority of noncooperators. Only a minority of zero would permit a voluntary system to work. Obviously, we would be fools to adopt any political or economic system that functions successfully only if literally everyone is virtuous. [129]
Pejoristic processes are easier to descry. Every pesticide, for example, selects for its own failure. (DDT, for instance, selects for DDT-resistant flies.) The rhythm method of birth control selects for arhythmic women. Voluntary population control selects for philoprogenitive instincts that mock at the system. Free competition among currencies selects for bad money. [131]
Though men have long assumed the general applicability of laissez-faire, they have not hitherto generalized from Gresham's Law to policy. In effect, they have treated this law as a special case. Had its generality been recognized earlier, we might sooner have recognized that in an unmanaged commons, greedy herdsmen drive out considerate one, grasping hunters drive out moderate ones, polluting industries drive out clean, and rapidly reproducing parents displace those who accept the limits to growth. [131]
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