Side payments for sustaining voting coalitions represent a cost in political decision making, and in its most aggravated form may raid the public treasury as a common pool resource. Therefore, wherever a governmental jurisdiction represents constituencies of a significantly different magnitude from those affected by its actions, an increasing bias toward inefficient solutions can be expected. [161]
This divergence between the expected costs to affected individuals and those to public entrepreneurs will lead public entrepreneurs to stress decision-making costs [on the right] and to discount deprivation costs [on the left] in any discussion of a common pool problem. They will tend to exaggerate the crisis nature of problems, thus shifting the estimated total collective choice cost curve of most individuals upward to the right. This has the effect of moving the estimated optimal decision rule to the left or toward a less inclusive rule. If public entrepreneurs are successful in leading individuals to believe that important opportunities will be foregone unless authority is given to a few to make decisions rapidly, a decision rule delegating responsibility to a limited proportion of affected individuals may be adopted. Affected individuals may later feel that the deprivation costs of such a decision are too high and attempt to change the basic rules. [170]
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