John Baden, "Neospartan Hedonists, Adult Toy Aficionados, and the Rationing of Public Lands", ed. Garrett Hardin and John Baden, Managing the Commons, San Fransisco, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1977.
There is little reason to believe that the bureaucracies involved would seek to maximize net social benefits. Bureaucracies tend to be run primarily for the bureaucrats, and the self-interest of the bureaucrats tends to be consistent with that of their stronger clients. Thus, a land manager would be expected to arrive at a system that is easy to administer and police, does not significantly disadvantage powerful groups in the political system, and improves the competitive position of the agency's stronger clientele groups. [247]
Casual observation leads me to believe that there is considerable resistance to the method of rationing by pricing at equilibrium because it precludes access by the poor. This argument assumes that poor people currently do visit national parks and wilderness areas, and that alternative rationing systems would disadvantage the poor less than a system based on price. This second point suggests that for the poor, time has a low opportunity cost; that the poor can plan ahead better than the affluent and, hence, can submit their reservations earlier than others; or that the poor enjoy greater success at corrupting officials than the affluent. [249]
No comments:
Post a Comment